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The Descent Unseen: Greece’s Unappreciated Place in British Political History
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History 498-01: Integrated Senior Seminar II
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From 1815-1915, the empire of Great Britain enjoyed a one hundred year period
of uninterrupted economic and political prosperity known as the Pax Britannica.
However, just a few decades after this time of hegemony, the same nation underwent a
drastic change that would alter the reality of its international influence. This realization
did not occur due to a loss of a colony from peaceful pressure, like India, or violent
revolutions, like in Egypt. Instead, the response to events within Greece between
December 1944 and June 1945 signaled the beginning of a British acceptance of their
position in world politics as a secondary player, and one that shied away from the
imperial mindset of old to recognize its place given the rising status of the United States
and the Soviet Union. The identification of this trend had noticeable implications on
British political history. The aforementioned rising stature of the United States and the
Soviet Union forced Great Britain to alter its policy course in Greece, and therefore
symbolized the decline of British political power.1
British interest in Greek affairs did not begin during Prime Minister Winston
Churchill’s term, but rather originated more than a hundred years prior. With the
beginning of the Greek War of Independence in March of 1821, the powers of Europe
recognized the degenerative state of the Ottoman Empire, and the need to position
themselves appropriately for the benefits of supporting a successful revolution. In
recognition of the fact that a settlement could never be reached, British Foreign Secretary
George Canning told the Turks that he would honor the friendly relations between them
in exchange for assurances that Christians who resided within the empire would not be
harassed. By 1824, leaders of the Greek Revolution took out loans from British fund1
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holders, which, in effect, made London a sponsor of the revolution and inspired the
creation of the ‘British’ political party in Greece. After this point, Great Britain, along
with nations like France and Russia, provided military assistance to the First Hellenic
Republic at battles such as the naval Battle of Navarino (1827), where an Allied fleet of
British, Russian and French warships defeated an Ottoman armada. British interjection
persisted after the revolution, such as during the debate over monarchial succession after
the deposition of King Otto in 1862.2
During World War II, several nationalist factions throughout Greece arose in
resistance to the German Army, similar to groups in South-East Asia in response to the
Japanese Army. As with many similar movements, some of these allied themselves with
the communist mindset, while others chose a more republican ideal. The Ethnikos
Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, or EDES (National Republican Greek League),
originated as grassroots resistance to the Germans and the communists. In June of 1944, a
liaison officer of the British Army referred to within telegrams as Major Bathgate,
submitted a report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs classifying the different
Greek nationalist groups. He described the EDES as a movement mainly kept going by a
few officers, such as Napoleon Zervas and his ally Major Agoras, and most of his officers
were pro-monarchy. According to this report, Zervas was a capable leader, but his
organization’s shortcomings in combat could be narrowed down to five reasons: poor
discipline, bad communication, no system of patrolling, no knowledge of infiltration or
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lines of battle, and long, useless typewritten orders on topics such as regimental
construction. 3
On the other hand, the communists within Greece generally fell under the
Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas or the KKE (The Communist Party of Greece). By
September of 1941, during a meeting of the KKE, the Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo or
EAM (National Liberation Front) was formed and become one of the most organized
resistance groups in World War II. The EAM’s militant wing, Ellinikós Laïkós
Apeleftherotikós Stratós, or the ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation Army) would become
infamous to republicans and royalists alike; British War Cabinet communications
described it as a “well organized gang of terrorists”.4 For example, Major Bathgate told
of how middle-aged men and women were forced to carry kalamboki, or maize, for days
across mountains and deep snow to feed the soldiers of the ELAS. Additionally, a boot
manufacturer in the town of Volos was threatened by the ELAS to increase his leather
supplies in order to supply additional forces, or else risk physical violence. Ares, the
leader of the ELAS, had a reputation of being responsible for many murders and an
overall pattern of ruthlessness. Despite these clear signs of ELAS aggression, Churchill
would later say to the House of Commons that he clearly underestimated the power of the
group. Churchill looked only at the ELAS’s efficiency and goals fighting the Germans,
but not their actions towards fellow countrymen. He would later realize their more
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sinister goal of transforming Greece into a Communist State with a totalitarian liquidation
of all political opponents.5
The communist sentiment of groups such as the ELAS also began to take hold in
Greeks outside of the country. The individuals most vulnerable to this dissention were the
military stationed to protect the controversial King George II, ruling in exile in Egypt.
The success of the ideological infiltration resulted in dissention amongst several army
and naval units. The Egyptian Mutiny, in April 1944, was a quintessential early
demonstration of the deep-seated animosity between the Communist and Republican
elements of Greek military and political institutions. This conflict arose from the desire of
the communist elements within the Greek government and citizenry to force King George
II to call for a plebiscite, in order to organize a new government for the nation while he
was still in exile. The king was not supportive of their efforts, he believed that he was
pressed to include them in his government. However, what was seen as seditious efforts
were also attempts by his Prime Minister, Emmanouil Tsouderos, to get a widely popular
archbishop appointed as regent through the Constitutional Act. According to Tsouderos,
not only was the king’s delay in signing the act, ‘destroying unity’ within the exiled
government, but also amongst the politicians in Athens. George II’s stubborn attitude
towards his rebellious constituents drew the ire of his British allies. Reginald Leeper,
ambassador from Britain, telegrammed the British Foreign Office that the king was

5

Ibid; “Typescript speaking notes for speech on the War Situation, 18 Jan 1945 - subjects
covered include fighting in the Ardennes, the Soviet advance in Germany…” The
Churchill Papers (CHAR 9/167), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill
Archive,
http://www.churchillarchive.com/explore/page?id=CHAR%209%2F167#image=0
(accessed 23 Oct 2013).

Schneider

5

“playing with a fire”, as he was endangering the interests of both the monarchy and his
country as a whole.6
The EAM realized the danger of a united front between politicians in Athens and
the Greek government in Cairo and acted in an attempt to take advantage of the lack of
communication between the exiled government and the one still in Athens. However, if
the remnants of Greek monarchial and republican power in the homeland could be
coordinated with the exiled monarchy in Egypt, the communists’ mission in Northern
Greece would ultimately fail. Therefore, an easy way to assure its success was to
infiltrate an organization with power and a population sympathetic to the cause: the
Greek Army. The attempts to counter this strategy became prevalent in the months to
come, and also became a constant consideration by skeptical republicans during
negotiations. One of the most affected units of EAM’s early infiltration was the Second
Field Regiment, in which a number of officers and over 200 men declared their support
of the Political Committee of National Liberation. Though members of the Ninth Army
removed these men from the camp, the downfall of a regiment showed the potential
power of the EAM to create dissention. For the immediate days following, Greek
politicians and ministers at several levels of government concurred with the idea that
communist infiltration was to blame for the discipline problems in the army.7
Mere days after the initial discoveries of the seditious presence, additional groups
allied with the communist cause began taking action. On April 5, 1944, 300 soldiers
6

“The Greek Crisis: April 1-25, 1944,” (Telegram No. 121), as found in the British
National Archives, reference CAB 66/49/47; The Greek Crisis: April 1-25, 1944,”
(Telegram No. 198), as found in the British National Archives, reference CAB 66/49/47.
7
The Greek Crisis: April 1-25, 1944,” (Telegram No. 202), as found in the British
National Archives, reference CAB 66/49/47; The Greek Crisis: April 1-25, 1944,”
(Telegram No. 207), as found in the British National Archives, reference CAB 66/49/47.

Schneider

6

occupied the office of the Greek Provost Marshal in Cairo, and only an overwhelming
presence by British Forces and Egyptian police convinced the soldiers to evacuate.
Additionally, a Merchant Marine seaman named Karayiannis barricaded himself, along
with thirty supporters, inside his own home and defied demands by police to disperse.
Troubled by these developments, Churchill discussed this issue with General Henry
Wilson. One idea called for a Greek Brigade to be sent without vehicles to assist in the
Allied offensive in Italy, as the Balkan soldiers were incredibly vulnerable to
contamination by revolutionary elements. The efforts made by the Greek communists did
not go unseen to the rest of the world, as the Soviet Union spoke well of the EAM-ELAS
efforts, as well as condemned Zervas for being the instigator of the civil war and an
obstacle to any agreements or negotiations on topics like a united command.8
By April 8, 1944, the situation had deteriorated, with the first individual Greek
Naval ship refusing to obey operational orders. Several reports confirmed that soldiers
from the Greek Brigade had taken up defensive positions around their camp and showed
no signs of letting up without force. As the British realized the extent by which the
dissention had spread throughout the ranks, General Wilson warned Churchill that
dispatching Greek units to Italy would be a risk to other elements in the Allied forces,
like the Polish and Yugoslavs.9
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Four days later, Greek and British authorities began to contemplate stern action in
an effort to curb the subversive behavior. One idea was to take violent steps to quell the
Mutiny, but the War Cabinet concluded that United States media outlets would view this
less favorably. The same officials stipulated an idea to issue a joint statement from all
three of the World War II Allies in support of Great Britain, but it did not amount to
much progress. Finally, by April 14th, the lack of supplies had taken its toll on the
barricaded soldiers and resistance grew less resolute with the passing days, and Churchill
himself rejected assistance from the Americans or Soviets. In other words, the Prime
Minister still believed that Great Britain possessed the ability to dictate policy
independent of the other World War II allies. To prevent these kinds of events from
reoccurring, Churchill went as far as telling his Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean
forces to fire on mutineers whenever necessary, as no officers or sailors had any right to
meddle in the formation of the new government. It did not prevent every case, as infantry
and tanks were needed as late as April 23 to capture Greek posts on the high ground of
camps that had been supplied with heavy weapons.10
However, since the root of the protests in Greece was the unwillingness of the
king to act in support of his people’s republican aspirations, Prime Minister Tsouderos
believed that this rebellion was Republican in nature, though communist in motivation.
By the end of the ordeal, George II caved to pressures and created a new government.
Nonetheless, this chaos unveiled the true lack of control both King George II Churchill’s
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government had over the political turmoil that would plague the Greek people for the
coming years. Churchill called for his Allies to help in the countering of the internal
strife that gave aid to the EAM after this lack of control was realized. Great Britain, in
defense of their Greek ally, assured nations like the United States that King George II still
represented and served his people. While this mutiny in Egypt did not cripple the ability
of the British government to execute its goals in the Middle East, the Greek Crisis was an
early indication that the British would not be able to accomplish their goals without any
resistance. Additionally, the diversity of people within Egypt sympathetic to the
communist cause foreshadowed the larger problem that would occur in Greece mere
months later. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that German forces began to retreat from
their Greek holdings, the militant wings of the Communist Party remained, and
succeeded in becoming a dangerous hindrance to the political will of Churchill.
However, it was evident that Great Britain still maintained the political will to execute its
own ideals, as others did not view this incident with any level of grave importance. By
December, when the chaos of Egypt would transfer to the Greek homeland, this British
feeling of control would start to be replaced by foreign council, and in the following
months, intervention.11
Despite the successful conclusion of the April Crisis in Egypt, tensions between
the communists and republicans remained. Their disagreements remained in the political
arena, as continued requests were made by the KKE and EAM to be included in a new
Greek government. As German forces withdrew from Greece, the ELAS began to take
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control over large areas of the countryside while the British settled into Athens with the
Papandreou government. On December 3, 1944, the situation erupted into a period of
violence, known as the Dekemvriana, which became the central focus of Allied efforts
inside the nation. By the time British forces counteracted this violence, the damage to
their mission had been done, as dissent from international and domestic sources had a
greater influence on the future of Greece than before.
In the months that led up to the violence, an important focus of the Papandreou
government was the disarmament of communist partisans. Domestic guerillas like the
Sacred Band and the Third Mountain Brigade were exempt from this, a policy that
provided a quandary for the leadership of the EAM. While some of the KKE, which
included the EAM and ELAS, viewed the British as liberators, they raised concerns in
regards to the perceived lack of protection that communists would have against armed
right wing militias. A counterproposal was devised by the KKE that called for the
complete disarmament of all paramilitary groups in Greece, right and left leaning alike.
Papandreou rejected this plan, and British General Ronald Scobie, in charge of the British
forces in Greece, called for an immediate end to the ELAS. The KKE immediately called
for the organization-wide resistance, as the control of the ELAS represented a great
source of strength for the Greek communist party. To the Allies, the British reaction
confused them, given all the British had done to ensure Greek prosperity in the future. In
the months prior they had forced out the German army and provided food, clothing,
supplies, and a limited, friendly military presence. Churchill saw these efforts as
supporting the UNRRA, or United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, to
ensure the nation’s rehabilitation. Additionally, at a time when tensions were at their

Schneider 10
peak, Panpadreou’s government included willing parties from all ideologies of the
political spectrum.12
Nevertheless, the frictions which divided pro-monarchy and anti-monarchy
factions became irreconcilable. To many within the communist and labor parties, the
favoritism shown towards right leaning groups, despite their history of violence, put
leftist ministers and leaders at a severe disadvantage. Additionally, the British officials
displayed this same bias, which left few alternative solutions. Attempts to finalize
disarmament resulted in the retirement of six government ministers who associated with
the EAM. The Greek communist party then decided to move away from Athens into the
north of the country. After he conceded to internal pressure, Scobie allowed a
demonstration to be held in Athens on December 3, 1944. About 200,000 people filled
the streets and gunshots were fired without warning. According to Geoffrey Hoare of
The Times, “Seeds of civil war were well and truly sown by the Athens police this
morning…the police opened fire with rifles and tommy guns. The firing was wild and
savage and continued sporadically for nearly an hour.”13 On the other hand, some British
individuals believed that EAM agitators purposely fired on the protesters in order to
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organize the Greek people against Scobie, and by extension the monarchy. At the end of
the initial shooting, more than 25 civilians were dead and hundreds injured.14
Most of the fighting that occurred during this period centered around Athens and
its surrounding areas and ports. On the night of December 4th, British army officials
became aware of advancing ELAS forces through a series of telegrams. One such
communication informed the army staff that communists came within one hundred yards
of the Greek center of government early in the violence. Considering these grave
circumstances, Churchill sent a message to his general on the best ways to counter this
threat. First, he stated that the British soldiers should resist the armed, male fighters, but
be wary of the women and children used to cover their retreats at times. Also, the armor
advantage possessed by Scobie should be utilized frequently as an intimidation tool.
Ultimately, the telegram ended with the stern message, “We have to hold and dominate
Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed if
possible, but also, with bloodshed if necessary.”15
Although they possessed the advantage in training and technology, the British and
Greek defenders were caught off-guard and were unable to halt the initial advances of the
ELAS. According to British sources, almost all of the police stations in Athens and the
Piraeus had been occupied or stormed by ELAS forces. Additionally, they had seized
most of Athens and surrounded the city center, which left a condensed area by which
14
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allied soldiers could rally for a counter-attack. Despite the ELAS’ progress, the EAM
made up the larger portion of resistance. Churchill wrote to Harry Hopkins, “I never
knew EAM would be so powerful”.16 In response, Scobie transferred elements of the 4th
Infantry Division from Italy to help repel the EAM from Athens. Even by December 11,
more than a full week after the outbreaks of violence, Field Marshall Alexander reported
that not only were his men exhausted, but lacked a foothold in the city as well as the
Piraeus harbor and airfield, preventing the distribution of much needed supplies.17
As the fight for the capital continued, a new factor complicated Great Britain’s
efforts: America’s influence. While the Soviet Union kept to its agreement from the
previous months, the United States press shifted public opinion against the British. As
early as December 10, Churchill wrote concerned telegrams to President Roosevelt with
the observation that, if there was validity to the claims that the United States condemned
British action in Greece, the resistance against the EAM organization would be severely
hampered. To the dismay of the prime minister, these fears were partially realized when
Roosevelt responded three days later that he was anxious to help in the situation, but
acknowledged the relative power of public feeling and opinion. While later action by the
United States involved a more hands-on approach in the future of Greece, this example
had an equivalent effect. Although communications during this period of the
Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. The
Alliance Declines(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 452.
17
“Typescript speaking notes for speech on the War Situation, 18 Jan 1945 - subjects
covered include fighting in the Ardennes, the Soviet advance in Germany…” The
Churchill Papers (CHAR 9/167), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill
Archive,
http://www.churchillarchive.com/explore/page?id=CHAR%209%2F167#image=0
(accessed 23 Oct 2013); Churchill. Triumph and Tragedy, 290; Warren F. Kimball, ed.,
Churchill and Roosevelt, Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 452;
Churchill. Triumph and Tragedy, 298.
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Dekemvriana demonstrated a separation in interests between two allies, it also placed
Great Britain in the position of reliance. Above many other factors, the Churchill’s
government felt besieged by the media, and American assurances to the global
community of the justness of their policies in Greece would remove politics as an
obstacle. At this point, the requests did not reach the level of material intervention, yet
public support had the ability to yield similar benefits. While Scobie alone could win the
mission of communist expulsion, the idea that Churchill and Britain wished for American
help was one that would reappear many times.18
The British soldiers in Greece understood the turn of public opinion against them,
and attempted to convince others of the misrepresentations in the press. In the
Censorship Summary for the Week ending on December 16, an unnamed general
remarked that despite the criticisms, he and his men were “full backing up…of Mr.
Churchill’s policy”.19 However, American sources, such as The New York Times
confirmed that Aneurin Bevan and Seymour Cocks of the British Labor Party threatened
a major divide within British society if support against “Greek Patriots” resumed. An
unidentified NCO on the ground urged the recipient of his letter to not draw any
conclusions from the papers, as the Prime Minister possessed a greater understanding of
the situation then any reporter. An additional officer echoed a valid concern about the
press, as he identified the fact that communists who were in combat with the British
believed that American popular opinion was on their side, which increased their
motivation. The label of freedom fighters could not be justified when they used young
18
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children in the front of protests as shield, echoed a different officer.20 These sentiments
were not isolated feelings, as almost three dozen separate statements of similar sentiment
were collected in one week alone, which displayed a level of uniform agreement between
the officers and the enlisted that the story reported in periodicals like the Times were
different than what individuals on the ground experienced.21
Another issue that emerged from the Dekemvriana concerned the plebiscite and
future of the Greek government. With George II in Egypt and the Papandreou
government unable to maintain civic order, British authorities began to look for
alternatives that would facilitate a stable transition to peace. Ministers such as Ronald
Leeper and Harold MacMillan opted for the appointment of center-left Archbishop
Damaskinos as regent, who garnered wide support from all parties, including the
communists. Nevertheless, George II was not convinced of the popular choice of the
archbishop as the head of the regency and cited a lack of reliability in MacMillan’s
findings. While this issue was far from resolved by the end of violence in January 1945,
the intensification of these discussions at this point signaled part of the British strategy to
rebuild Greece, not in their image, but by the desires and for the benefit of the people.22
With the ceasefire on January 15, 1945, a great drain on the resources of the
British Army ended, and its effects were to be felt for months to come. First, the fight
20
21
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against the ELAS-EAM impacted other World War II fronts, as 75,000 soldiers needed to
fight the remaining German Army had to be deployed to Athens. Additionally, the
portrayal of the Communists as sympathetic freedom fighters in the press handicapped
Great Britain’s ability to call upon the United States for aid. Conversely, another side
effect of the increased exposure of Greece to the American public was the greater
attention of President Roosevelt and his government to the situation, a fact that became
more important in the following months. Ultimately, the Dekemvriana represented the
beginning of challenges for the British in terms of their ability to continue to shape
Greece in their singular vision.23
Besides the failure of the British government to contain the military potential of
the EAM and ELAS, the intrusion, or perceived intrusion, of foreign interests in the
region created a powerful obstacle for Winston Churchill and his advisors. Several
decisions highlighted the potential for foreign influence to dictate or alter the policy in
Greece and put the British Prime Minister in a difficult position. There was little
precedence in British foreign policy on how to address and work with the suggestions of
more powerful nations, as well as dealing with multinational scrutiny. As had been the
case in the several proceeding decades, the Soviet Union was consistently a consideration
when it came to Eastern European affairs. Given the geographical proximity of Greece to
the Balkan nations, as well as the nature of communist expansion that followed the Red
Army triumphs in World War II, Churchill would be forced to heed the potential of the
Soviet Union to create turbulence in the region. With the ending of the war becoming

23
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more inevitable, Britain began to notice how the different spheres of influence were
taking shape.
As the spread of Russian form communism affected many nations throughout the
Balkans, the development of the ideology in Greece differed from their neighbors.
Organizations like the EAM, though communist, did not receive the assistance from
Soviet sources to "communize” the peninsula. Instead, the Russians preferred to utilize
the Yugoslavian, Albanian, and Greek movements in order to gain ideological influence
in Southeastern Europe. The general hesitancy of the Soviet Union to publicly support
groups like the EAM ended in August of 1944, as they came out backing the Greek
communists and criticizing British policy in the region. Churchill and his staff realized
that despite agreements of the Lebanon Conference, which helped absorb EAM and other
communists into an all-party government, many things could go wrong and allow the
Soviet Union to return. Alternative plans included partnerships with communists hostile
to the Soviets, like Tito in Yugoslavia. While the constant fight for political positioning
was not unique to this time period, Great Britain’s ability to bargain with Russia was
directly hampered by their decline in political power; a position largely unfamiliar to the
British of the previous hundred year period.24
As the Dekemvriana took its toll on British confidence, Churchill voiced his
disdain and fear over the growing communist sphere to Field Marshall Smuts. Churchill
wrote, “If the powers of evil should prevail in Greece, as is quite likely, we must prepare
for a quasi-Bolshevized Russian-led Balkans peninsula, and this may spread to Italy and

24
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Hungary.”25 Despite reports from sources in the previous months that the Russians
maintained little interest in the region, even to the extent that the Greek Communist Party
was not given representation in Moscow, Churchill was not convinced that this
guaranteed the cessation of Russian interference. Instead, he cited the fact that the
Communist and Left Wing within the nation had began to garner the sympathy of the
international community, including the American media.26
However, by February of the following year, the British government believed that
the need to feel threatened by Soviet influence was gone. The British cabinet reported,
“Premier Stalin had most scrupulously respected his acceptance of our position in
Greece…He understood that the emissary sent to the U.S.S.R by the Greek Communists
had first been put under the arrest”.27 The spirit of mutually assured cooperation
continued, as the idea of spheres of influence returned to the negotiations. To ensure a
lack of interference by the Russians in Greece specifically, the British agreed to allow
Soviet influence to assume control over other British interests in the region, such as the
nations of Bulgaria and Romania. Nevertheless, part of the negotiations included that
Joseph Stalin could send observers to the region in order to confirm that an anticommunist leader, like the right leaning General Plastiras, could not establish a right
wing dictatorship.28
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had less influence in the Greek affairs than
in other parts of Europe by the end of March 1945, Churchill and his advisors remained
Winston S Churchill. Triumph and Tragedy, 311.
Ibid.
27 “W.M. (45) 22nd Conclusions, Minute 1: Confidential Annex,” as found in the British
National Archives, reference CAB 65/51/22.
28
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British National Archives, reference CAB 65/51/26.
25
26

Schneider 18
suspicious. For instance, the British Foreign Secretary felt that the easiest way for a
prolonged civil war to emerge in Greece would be for the USSR to back a claim for the
ELAS to have an equal say in the formation of the Greek Army. Churchill, who sent a
letter to President Roosevelt that asked if it was prudent to include the Russians on the
economic missions, also spoke to this suspicion. More important than the content of the
request by Churchill was that he had to consult another superpower in order to both
validate his country’s concerns, as well as seek approval for future actions. Nonetheless,
cooperation with a power destined to be adversarial for decades suggested a feeling of
disparity and uncertainty by the British, a feeling that can be attributed to a newfound
realization of secondary status. 29
While the threat of Soviet sway over Greece seemed to diminish, the United
States consistently attempted to insert their ideas into the rebuilding of Greece, from
proposed political changes to the reorganization of the army. Nonetheless, the fact that
Churchill was forced to consider the American position on many aspects of Greek
organization he found important was an indicator of the increasing levels of influence
others had on the reconstruction of the British ally. While this became evident as soon as
the Egyptian Mutiny in April, the events of the Dekemvriana polarized opinions abroad
on the correct manner to handle Greece. Communications between Churchill and
President Roosevelt on the topic of Greece followed the British decision to intervene in
the affairs of their ally, and Churchill and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins debated on
American assistance as early as December 10. Concerned with the prospect of fighting
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the communists alone, Churchill wrote, “If it can be said in the streets of Athens that the
United States are against us, then more British blood will be shed and much more
Greek.”30 Despite the fact that the American media had been sympathetic to the ELAS
cause, the leaders of Britain needed unity with their powerful ally in order to avoid
further devastation of military and political capital. The next day, a private letter from
Churchill to Hopkins further pleaded for America to support Great Britain.31
Relief came in the form of a telegram from Roosevelt, which reassured Churchill
that the friendship between the two nations still existed. However, while Roosevelt had
sympathy for the situation in Greece, the power of pressing circumstances, such as the
sway of public opinion, prevented a suitable intervention. Besides negative reactions in
regards to the ELAS, rumors of Britain giving territorial concessions in Poland to the
Soviet Union caused protests as well. It is at this point that American representatives
voiced some of the first calls for King George II to establish a regency.32
Despite Roosevelt’s hesitancy to act, Churchill continued to write about the
military challenges that faced Greece, only resisted by the British. According to a
telegram written on December 17, at a time when primary focus was recapturing the port
of Piraeus and the city of Athens, British General Staff Intelligence found that after more
than a week of fighting, no more than 12,000 ELAS remained, but they took a heavy toll
on the civilian population.33
As the violence dissipated, the discussion between the United States and Great
Britain shifted from assistance on the military front to more political ideals. By December
30
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26, Churchill assured Roosevelt that with the violence lessening, it must always be
understood that he, and the country, sought nothing from Greece, in territory or
advantages. Nevertheless, the need for Churchill to justify the validity of his country’s
actions suggests that their allies were beginning to take a larger and more vocal role in
Greece’s future, which still had British troops on the ground. As discussions began in
regards to the appointment of a regent due to the lack of a plebiscite, Churchill made the
British position clear. First, he supported Archbishop Damaskinos and urged Roosevelt to
agree with his thinking, especially given the fact that Damaskinos’s rapport with the
EAM had the potential to lead to quick negotiations and forgo civil war.34
With agreements signed by Communist and pro-Republican representatives in
February, the British began to heavily focus on rebuilding Greece into a stable power.
These decisions, which included the reformation of the Greek army and the extent of
economic aid, consistently included discussions that analyzed the American perspective.
For example, in a War Cabinet conclusion from March 12, the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs stated that General Scobie was hesitant of informing the United States
government of goals to reduce the military commitment to Greece. Primarily, Scobie was
concerned that the Americans would decide to inject themselves in that role of Greece’s
savior, and take the credit for their rescue. However, the Secretary became less skeptical
of cooperation in terms of financial and economic aid. These kinds of considerations
were typical of this period in Britain’s relationship with Greece, as many discussions
regarding the economics of Greek restoration increasingly involved American aid or
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resources as at least a factor, if not the driving force behind the different plans to be
implemented in the coming months.35
The distrust of the Soviet Union became apparent in the debate over the American
role in the economic recovery effort. In his April 3 correspondence with Roosevelt,
Churchill suggested a joint Anglo-American committee for the benefit of the Greek
government that would allow for two advisors from each nation to have close proximity
to the Greeks. Nonetheless, a central idea seemed to be that the British did not want
American interests, especially business, to be left unchecked. Despite the suspicion,
Churchill urged the assistance of Donald M. Nelson, former executive vice president of
Sears Roebuck. Later, Roosevelt confirmed that the Greek government had informally
approached the US about a similar idea, but he was going to reject it at that time, as the
preferred group for the UNRRA was better equipped for this task. It was not increasingly
clear by this point in Churchill’s administration, the power the British had over the future
of their ally seemed contingent on the ideas and preferences of the United States..36
While the potential influences of the Soviet Union and United States had an
undeniable effect on the course of British intervention in Greece, there were certain
internal issues throughout this period that became significant to the British and the
Greeks. The conclusion of the Dekemvriana allowed for a relatively uninterrupted
opportunity to act on specific goals, originating from needs that became apparent when
sections of Athens were under siege. First of all, Churchill realized that the political
origins of the tensions within Greece could be addressed through satisfying the popular
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demand of a plebiscite and free elections. Additionally, as the problems of relying on
militias became apparent, a debate emerged as to the extent that the British army would
be involved in the country. Though the need for a governmental alternative to King
George II and his minister began as early as the previous April, the Dekemvriana brought
to the attention of many within Churchill’s government the need for a plebiscite. It
became clear that in order to avoid a similar outbreak of violence in the future, a leader
had to be elected that would speak to a wider array of people, not just British interests,
while the king remained in exile. An early nomination by the British for the new
government was Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens, despite the vocal protests of the
existing Papandreou administration. The main apprehension was the comfort the
Archbishop had with members of the EAM, an asset some feared would be used against
the existing ministers. Nevertheless, an early compromise initially explored was the
formation of a regency of three, which would consist of Damaskinos as the figurehead.37
Both the Greeks and British understood that the appointment of a regent needed to
be tolerated by George II. Initially, this task proved to be difficult, as the Greek king
vehemently disagreed with the notion that Damaskinos constituted a wish of the people.
In fact, he referred to the potential of the Archbishop’s appointment as, “An
abandonment of the struggle,” and would create confusion on the front to the extreme
left.38 In addition, the Greek Constitution stated that in the event that the king could not
be present in the country to rule within his government, the Crown Prince would be
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appointed regent. In a letter to Churchill, the Greek monarch stated, “I have never
solicited anyone’s help to safeguard my Throne and you know…how wronged I am by
those who think I would wish to rely on anything other than the will of my people”.39
Members of the Greek government, such as Minister A. Alexandris, believed that the
internal conditions of Greece did not make the appointment of the regency necessary, as
the consequences would result in a victory for the otherwise dilapidated communists.
This position became a contentious issue, up to the eventual capitulation by George II in
the upcoming weeks.40
The submission by the King came due to the accumulated weight of political
pressure by the British, as well as representatives within Greece. An early example came
from prominent centrist Greek politician Themistoklis Sofoulis, who sent a telegram,
with support of many politicians, that not only endorsed the appointment of the
Archbishop, but strongly advised the King to agree. Additional pressure came from
Churchill himself, who, in a communication with President Roosevelt, commented that
he “had to tell the King that if he did not agree the matter would be settled without him
and that we should recognize the new government instead of him”.41 The threat of the
instillation of a government against the wishes of the nation’s ruler harkened to an
imperial mindset of Britain, the very threat of which motivated George II to act against
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his own beliefs. However, this display of British power and influence would not be
replicated in this fashion many more times during Churchill’s administration.42
The politics evolved as violence in the capital began to subside. An egregious
error was printed by the Greek press soon after the New Year, which stipulated that not
only was the Archbishop unwilling to allow EAM representation in the new government,
but he would also lend a willing ear to the ideas of the king. The repercussions of this
statement had grave potential, with a misunderstanding with the United States being the
most troublesome of all. Eden and Leeper argued that the Papandreou government was
responsible for the misrepresentation, and urged the king to not share any
communications of that caliber with anyone but the regent. The Greek monarch’s lack of
enthusiasm continued to be a hindrance for Churchill’s government, yet their faith in the
potential of Damaskinos allowed them to continue in their goal for a democratic
Greece.43
Nevertheless, progress was made and the popularity of the temporary government
spread. The success prompted ideas of additional plebiscites in liberated areas, even in
the north, where a conceivable attempt could be made by the ELAS to seize power
through a democratic process. While the British did not perceive the success in a similar
manner as the Greeks, Leeper and Churchill encouraged a potential plebiscite of
confidence in the Archbishop’s government in all the liberated areas. A successful
display of confidence could reinforce the authority of Damaskinos, and by extension,
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legitimize the goals of the British. From this point in January until the end of Churchill’s
time as prime minister, the continuation of free elections was an issue of paramount
importance, as it symbolized a large victory over communist forces.44
The success of British policies in the country partially relied on the ability of
soldiers to ensure a repeat of the Dekemvriana did not occur. During the month long
period of violence, the British army had to divert much needed resources to combat the
communists, a luxury not available if a similar situation emerged. Additionally,
Republican forces, such as the EDES, were controversial for their extreme methods and
therefore could not be solely relied upon. George II recognized the sacrifice of the
Englishmen who defended his country, and agreed that the majority of them should be
allowed to withdraw from Greece as soon as Athens became secure. However, the
accomplishments of General Scobie could not remain if the Greek army became unable
to preserve the newfound peace. By January, as the violent communist resistance died
down, a discussion arose as to how to purse the goals of a self-sufficient Greece when the
national armed forces were woefully unprepared to counter another potential uprising.
Churchill and the British believed that the first step lay in the ability of the Greeks to
defend their own nation. According to Cabinet Minutes from January 8, “It was clear that
by our action we had prevented a massacre. It was now for the Greek Government which
had been established to raise the necessary National Forces.”45 Since these goals were
accomplished, the next step, according to Field Marshal Alexander, was to establish a
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military infrastructure to assist in defense, such as a corridor linking the commercial port
areas of Patras with Athens. These improvements came with a proposed truce by
Alexander that would ensure peace through a forced and complete disarmament of all
irregular forces within Greece.46
Despite the formal signing of the cease-fire at Varkiza in February, the army and
national defense remained an issue into April and June. In spite of the hope to have a
majority of British soldiers withdrawn months’ prior, Scobie still possessed the
responsibilities of advisor to the Greek government, as well as commander of the British
garrison. However, a communication between Churchill and Roosevelt on April 3, 1945,
conveyed the hope that that the “operational phase” of the Greek involvement was over,
which would allow for the UNRRA to assume responsibility for aid distribution instead
of the army. Additionally, at this point Churchill welcomed the “continued collaboration”
of the United States Embassy in Athens. As April became June, the need to solidify a
system in preparation for an eventual British departure from Greece persisted. The theme
of these discussions had not changed, as many encouraged a minimal presence of British
soldiers while native forces were being prepared. According to the Cabinet, the single
area in which British council could have the greatest impact was in regards to the
military. However, as the resources available to the British for Greece lessened, the more
economics began to factor into army decisions. This was reflected in the advice to train
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and maintain a national defense force that could only guarantee internal security, which
would allow neighboring nations like Yugoslavia to posses more imposing forces. A
commonality in those austerity measures was that American aid helped dictate to what
extent the rebuilding could occur, even if the British military was in control of the
organization, administration, discipline and training. However, these measures would
diminish the economic and military drain on Great Britain’s resources, theoretically
allowing them to maintain some semblance of control over the resources left in the
country. By settling matters early, the British would also be able to keep the interested
USSR and USA from intervening for a while longer. Despite the need for British
involvement as advisors, the definitive goal was clearly defined as Greek governmental
autonomy.47
While the goals of free elections and military sovereignty were ideas of the
British from the earliest periods of their involvement with Greece, an increasing theme
became the insertion and consideration of American capabilities. As the debates, which
surrounded the formation of the Greek army, largely occurred at the end of Churchill’s
term as Prime Minister, the gradual increase of American considerations into the debates
was a sign for things to come after Churchill’s departure. The plebiscite had a similar
trend, as a main goal of the British was to appear democratic in the face of media scrutiny
that saw groups like the EAM as democratic movements of the people.
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Every factor previously discussed, from the Dekemvriana to the intervention of
American interests, helped to dictate the course of British policy in Greece. The
development of these specific interests over the six-month period from December 1944 to
June 1945 demonstrated a distinct transformation in the nature of Churchill’s decisions,
reflecting an overall decline in the influence of the British nation. The month of
December became particularly significant due to the fact that many debates over the
subsequent months originated specifically during this period. Of the many topics that
took center stage, the three most significant were the implications of the Dekemvriana on
international relations, the extent of the British military mission in the country, and the
future of a democratically elected Greek government.
The outbreak of the Dekemvriana shocked Greek and British officials alike, as it
left them generally unprepared for the assault on Athens and Piraeus. The beginning of
the ELAS assault on the capital signaled the moment when Churchill took direct control
of the situation, and Greek preservation became a top priority. In the name of that control,
Churchill did not wait to consult most of the Cabinet, as the time spent would have
potentially delayed the assistance Greece needed. In other words, Winston Churchill
made it abundantly clear that the security of the Balkan nation was not only a national
issue, but one of personal importance as well. However, even as early as December 5
1944, United States Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. began to make observations
on the different policy approaches to Greek preservation by the United States and Great
Britain.48
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At the same time as the statement by Stettinius, Churchill addressed the House of
Commons on the events that had developed in recent days, as well as the clear goals and
aspirations of his government. This speech was published in the New York Times, as the
American public had begun to take interest in what was happening in Greece. According
to Churchill, the civil war was just one facet of the hardships facing the nation, which
included economic and financial problems that the United States and Great Britain
together would work out. This statement’s importance stemmed from the fact that
although Greece had been an interest of British, the inclusion of American support was
now needed to convince some of the Greek cause. Nevertheless, the greatest obstacle
became the extent force would be used to correct the woes of civil strife. Churchill urged
the House of Commons that in these violent times, the burden fell on the Allied military
sphere to use force in order to prevent greater bloodshed. The armed force would be
dependent on the Greek government, since private armies owed allegiance to an
ideology.49
Although this British position was theorized earlier than the publication date, The
New York Times published a cable on December 17 that identified the American position
on Greece at the time. According to the United States War Department, the US military
would be strictly limited to relief and rehabilitation. In addition, “American personnel
assigned to Greece…are not authorized to participate, directly or indirectly, in any
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operational phase.”50 American combat soldiers within the vicinity of wartime operations
were told to refrain from any activity that could be conceived as intervention, an
unpopular idea in the United States. This idea would continue to be important in the
Anglo-American relationship, as the place for Allied troops in a country like Greece
would remain a subject of debate between the World War II allies.51
Many in the United States did not embrace the case for British intervention. The
same day that the text of Churchill’s speech was published in The New York Times, an
article appeared on page 11advocating for a strong US intervention in spite of the efforts
by Great Britain. Basil Vlavianos, head of the Greek section of the International Editorial
Board of the Free World Association and editor of the Greek Newspaper, The National
Herald, wrote, “Monarchist forces wanting the return of King George are behind the
present effort to divide Greece and unfortunately they are backed by the British.”52 To
Vlavianos, the British support of the hereditarily related monarch symbolized the policy’s
effect on the spheres of influence. These spheres were responsible for the potential of
reactionary forces, like the EDES, supported by foreign interests who wished to master
the situation. Therefore, the postulation that the resistance movements were solely
communistic in nature was a farce. Outspoken criticism of Greek intervention from the
United States grew as the fighting in Athens continued. The collective domestic criticism
had a noticeable effect on the United States government, as Roosevelt wrote to Churchill
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that while he would have liked to assist public opinion in the nation made that prospect
unlikely.53
In many of the criticisms of Churchill’s policy, a common question regarded the
political future of Greece, including the selection of a group to replace the unpopular
Papandreou government. By December 1944, the threat of non-inclusion for communists
in the post-Nazi government led some to question the true democratic nature of Greek
leadership, and any role Great Britain would play in its selection. According to Churchill,
“Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their
decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision.”54 The
job of the British at the time was to ensure, through deployment of the Army, that law
and order could be maintained. The assurance of stability would allow for the people of
Athens, and Greece as a whole, to be more prepared to vote on their future. This stance
was believed to garner the support of the majority of the Greek population. Churchill
declared that Great Britain, under the proxy leadership of General Scobie, would take
care that the government would not attach itself to any specific faction.55
However, the use of British force to ensure free elections led to many objections
in the House. One of the voices of dissent came from Laborite F.E. Pethic Lawrence,
who asked if Churchill could assure the House that, if the armed forces of Britain and the
Allies supported the government, they would enforce the need for governmental change
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and not just preserve the status quo with European military backing. This question
addressed two key issues of the time, the place of free elections as well as how the
presence of the military could influence the future of Greece. Towards the conclusion of
the speech, Lawrence challenged the prime minister to assure members of Parliament that
his government would remind the Greeks that, despite present hostilities, all political
identifications needed to be included in the elections. Ultimately, the concerns within the
dissenting members originated from a fear that increased intervention would resemble an
imperial mindset, a course the country would be unable to pursue, due to both economic
restrictions, as well as unwillingness from public opinion. In the coming months,
especially after the Treaty of Varkiza, the issue of communist inclusion would resonate
for survivors of the December violence and became a contentious issue for the emergent
government. For both, their December introduction to members of Parliament displayed
the level of importance the administration assigned to this issue.56
As the violence continued throughout December, different statements were made
as to how to classify the British military response. Papandreou stated, according to the
minister in charge of Greek Information Services, Nicholas Lely, that he was against the
use of force as much by the Right as on the Left. However, what that statement did not
convey was any view of the 5,000 soldiers within the country as intervention. According
to Papandreou on December 7, 1944, “British assistance to us is not intervention.
Intervention exists when it takes place in free nations where public sovereignty
functions…When a people, however, have not gained political liberty…it is not
56
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intervention; it is then liberation.”57 Therefore, if Greece possessed an army that did not
consist of factions of conflicted interests, the sacrifice of the Allies would not have been
necessary. Nevertheless, the leader of the recently liberated Greek nation confirmed the
ideas perpetuated by Churchill: the British army’s role was not of an occupying force, but
to liberate and ensure the democratic process could continue uninhibited.58
The last month of 1944 held great significance for the development of British
political power. Violence and anarchy in the streets of Athens caused many of the core
ideals of the Greek protection to be questioned by foreign media, as well as by the local
government. Nonetheless, many of the issues raised would reappear consistently
throughout the next six months. Some, like the place of the British military, remained
contentious throughout the remainder of Churchill’s time as Prime Minister. Others, such
as the place of free elections and sovereignty, became a staple of the United States policy
towards Greece, as their voice in the matter became stronger and more influential.
As the debates on the future of Greece continued, influenced by factors such as
the media and political pressure, the month of January 1945 proved to be one in which
Churchill was able to make his ideas and convictions on these discussions known.
Through his speeches, such as his address to the House of Commons, the prime minister
was able to address his critics and give them all reason to support the continual effort to
ensure the safety of the Balkan nation. The discussions on improvement were paired with
noticeable progress in many of the controversial areas that generated criticism, such as
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the persuasion of King George II over the plebiscite issue and the formation of a truce to
end the violence within the capital. Nevertheless, the negotiations and steps taken during
this period would become unique, as they represented an end to the time when Greece
was shaped under the sole vision of the British.
With the arrival of the New Year, the formulation of a truce between government
and communist forces became imperative. For Churchill, success of this goal would have
the potential to turn opponents in both the media and Parliament over to his side. As early
as January 2, 1945, American media sources began to notice the efforts of the British
Prime Minister to facilitate a cessation of the month long fight. According to the
anonymous author of a New York Times article entitled “Greek Regency”, Churchill’s
interventionist strategy revealed the advantages of “grasping the Greek nettle firmly.”59
The grasp referred to the initiative taken in order to ensure the beginning of talks between
many of the warring party leaders, excluding the remnants of royalist forces. However,
the success of the future of negotiations depended on the skills of Archbishop
Damaskinos to facilitate a representative administration. The initial reports presented by
this media source did not yet show a willingness of the EAM or ELAS to negotiate with
Scobie, but initial progress was clear.60
At the same time, the debate surrounding the plebiscite continued, as King George
II remained a key obstacle for unilateral support of the Archbishop and his government.
As previously mentioned, a problem arose with the release of misleading documents from
the Greek government, that amongst other inaccuracies, stated that Damaskinos, “Did not
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intend to allow E.A.M to be represented in the New Government, and that the Regent
would be in close contact with the King.”61An additional misnomer from this release was
the supposed relationship the regent sought with the king, which meant that the monarchy
would wield considerable influence in future decision making. For members of the
communist groups, their contempt for the king was not the only reason why this prospect
concerned them. With a cessation of violence in the relative future for Greece, a concern
arose as the possibility that, despite their role in the violence, they would not be extended
an invitation to join the new government.62
In congruence with Winston Churchill’s disdain for and confusion over the
situation, Minister Anthony Eden identified a crucial problem. Prime Minister
Papandreou leaked the telegram, against the clearly expressed wishes of Damaskinos,
who decided that he had to carry out the king’s previous discussions. However, progress
seemed to have been made, as Eden continued to state in the telegram to Leeper that
George II admitted the inaccuracies within the leak, as well as the fact that the blind
loyalty of Papandreou seemed odd. In his effort to ease the job of the Archbishop, Eden
recommended that the King be given explicit instructions to not send messages to anyone
but the Regent, and, “It must be of a character to help him in his task and not hinder
him.”63 For Churchill, Eden and the rest of the Cabinet, a small victory in this power
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struggle came when George II of Greece understood and agreed to not deliberately stand
in the Archbishop’s way, though he held little enthusiasm.64
Nonetheless, by January 07, under political pressure, the British sponsored
Georgios Papandreou resigned and was replaced by 62-year-old Liberal Party’s Nicholas
Plastiras. He pledged that his new government would, amongst other things, impose legal
order, punish the collaborators of the German occupation, and assist in food and shelter
distribution. Despite Plastiras’ attempt to distance himself from the British, ELAS leaders
at the time did not accept a ceasefire due to Scobie’s failure to confirm the Government’s
intent to disarm right wing militia groups at the same time as the communists. The
hesitancy over potential favoritism persisted despite the fact that one or more EAM
members were invited to take leadership positions at newly elected posts in the Cabinet.
Additionally, unease still centered on the British idea to maintain a stable and strong
military presence within Greece until a national defense force could be raised. However,
the estimated time for withdrawal was still four months away, according to Churchill.
Though the retreat of ELAS forces hinted at the beginning of serious negotiations, several
sources, including the Manchester Times, questioned the motives of both Plastiras and the
British in the request for a ceasefire, as speculations were made from sympathetic
onlookers that the ELAS would not continue to fight if not for “a powerful cause.”65
Although Churchill wrote that he believed the ELAS was driven off by force of
arms, it was the resolution of an issue within the conflict that lead to great headway and
64

Ibid.
"Hope for Greece: Premier Chosen Assaying the Hopes." New York Times, .
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.chapman.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/107120002/
B3DBE7EF921E43C8PQ/4?accountid=10051 (accessed March 10, 2014);“Prime
Minister’s Personal Minute” as found in the British National Archives, reference FO
954/11C/415
65

Schneider 37
an eventual ceasefire: the release of communist hostages. In his speech to Parliament
more than a week later, the prime minister highlighted the grave situation for many. At
the conclusion of the Greek section of the speech, he told the story of a British officer
named Colonel Morrow. He described a column of hostages being led away from Athens
on Christmas Day, with individuals dying every day on the march from starvation and
exposure. When these prisoners finished the journey to the ELAS-controlled camps in the
north, no one provided food. After a considerable time, some of the soldiers raised a
hundred dollars, which bought only a half loaf of bread. Additionally, the Colonel heard
stories about political prisoners who were being shot and robbed, as were protesters.66
The address was not the first time the Prime Minister’s administration addressed
the issue of treatment of political hostages. However, by January 12, close to the signing
of the truce between the Communists and the British, British negotiators believed that
this singular issue could not be the hindrance to a lasting peace. This revelation was made
to the concern of both the regent and General Plastiras, as the Archbishop informed the
ELAS representative of his profound shock. General Scobie urged the Greek leaders that
their anger over the issue was not ignored, as British civilians were also taken during the
violence. As Leeper and other members of the War Cabinet wished for the cessation of
violence to come, a recommendation was released which stated, “The release of these
hostages should be accompanied by some guarantee of immunity in the case of
persons…who were not guilty of acts contrary to the rules of war.”67 Despite this
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announcement, some discussed the amnesty of General Ares, leader of the ELAS, for the
sake of national unity, though officials such as the British Foreign Secretary equated it to
blackmail. Ultimately, despite the terms signed by representatives of the ELAS and
British, His Majesty’s government made it clear that the agreement could not endure into
peace unless hostages had been safeguarded or released.68
The formulation of the truce, including an agreement for the gradual release of
hostages, set the stage for Prime Minister Churchill to champion the cause within the
House of Commons. Though it covered many wartime concerns on both fronts of World
War II, it included a lengthy discussion about the history of the Greek conflict, as well as
the progress being made. Firstly, the Prime Minister gave an in-depth background on the
conflict, as well as a reminder that the origin of the British presence in the country was to
expel the Nazis. When the British returned to help rebuild the liberated nation, both the
EDES and EAM alike invited them, and despite the writings of American newspapers,
went in with “Good gifts in our hands; stability and assistance to the all-Party Greek
Govt.”69 Nevertheless, Churchill stated that even before the outbreak of violence, he
knew not to discount the communist directed ELAS and their ability to cause chaos. As
violence erupted, the Prime Minister reminded his audience that the communists within
Greece had tried both political and military means to achieve power, as the entire
situation was a struggle for power.70
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In spite of Great Britain’s hubris, Churchill proudly stated that the eventual
victory in Athens was the key to the preservation of Greek freedom itself. As part of that
freedom, the appointment of the Archbishop was allowed to occur relatively unimpeded,
with strong anti-communist General Plastiras as Prime Minister. According to the speech,
these governing efforts were the first step of many to eliminate the rampant backstabbing
and back dealing between many members of power within the Greek government. An
additional challenge, according to Churchill, would be the integration of former
communists back into the government of the Greek people, as many within the nation
itself wished for no amnesty or forgiveness. Most importantly, Churchill reinforced for
all those who witnessed this address the answer to the question of what Britain wanted
from Greece. While some speculated the involvement of the nation was a move of ‘power
politics’, Churchill cleared any misconceptions with a powerful proclamation: “I repeat,
we want nothing for Greece but her friendship, and to earn it and to deserve it we have to
do our duty.” For hundreds of thousands of men, women and children to live without fear
of murder or pillaging, prosperity approached, though at a deliberate pace.71
By the conclusion of the speech, the British representative body voted 340-7 in
support of the goals for the reconstruction. These goals included the ending of violence
within Athens and the surrounding country, as well as the solidification of the
Archbishop’s position and a government loyal to the people as opposed to the monarch.
This symbol of support for the goals of Churchill within Greece was the high point for
the British, as foreign governments and media interests had not forced them to abandon
their overall goals for freedom and sovereignty in the Balkan state.
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While Churchill enjoyed nominal political success during the month of January
1945, the following three months became a time when the British ideas of Greece’s
future were established. This solidification began as the violence that had consumed
Southern Greece for over a month officially ended with the Treaty of Varkiza on
February 12, 1945. However, as different policies were envisioned, the influence of
outside actors, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, became more pronounced.
Therefore, the discussions and debates within the British government began to reflect less
on the British desires for Greece, and more on the increasingly influential place their
World War Two allies would have.
Although an armistice had been reached by January 11, 1945, a formalized
ceasefire between the Greek Government and the EAM was not finalized until a month
later at Varkiza, a suburb of greater Athens. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs,
supported by the British, met with the Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, and
among the many aspects of this treaty was a guarantee of free elections throughout the
country. According to Article IX, a popular plebiscite would occur within the year in
order to amend any problems within the Greek Constitution, and thus create a constituent
assembly that would, in turn, draft a new organic law. Additionally, both signatories
agreed that the World War Two allies of Great Britain would send representatives to
verify the elections. Equally important was the disarmament of EAM-ELAS, which they
agreed to on the condition that the new national army would be one without any bias, left
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or right. Within the next few days, the ELAS surrendered over a hundred different pieces
of artillery, mortars, machines guns and radios.72
The establishment of peace garnered praise from many Allies within the country.
On February 14, 1945, Prime Minister Plastiras addressed a crowd and said, “On behalf
of Greece, the Government expresses their deep gratitude to her Great Allies and
especially to yourself, Mr. Prime Minister…her great friend and supporter.”73 In a
manner usually reserved for heroes, Plastiras described Churchill as the voice that
strengthened the Greek people’s resistance against the barbarians and animated its
fortitude and hope. On the same date, the Archbishop praised Winston Churchill for his
presence in the country. According to Damaskinos, “The presence…of the British Prime
Minister among us…giving thus, one more proof of the lively interest of his great country
for her friends, Greece.”74 Specifically, the Regent of Athens recalled the personal visit of
Churchill, during the violence of the Dekemvriana, in an attempt to bring about a
ceasefire. This personal investment conveyed a guarantee to the Greek people that
England would honor its commitment to the country, despite the hard times ahead.75
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Following his negotiations at Yalta, Churchill reported to The House of Commons
on the various decisions and how they applied to each country with British interests. In
regards to Greece, Churchill referred to his trip to Athens as the high spot of the whole
journey. He described his trip with Damaskinos through the city center, as crowds of
cheering people clogged the streets, which created the greatest protests of its kind ever
witnessed by Churchill personally. The sight would have been unbelievable to many who
had followed the events of the nations through the American media, as Churchill stated
that there had not “been any on which greater prejudice and misrepresentation have been
poured out against them in the United States.”76 This prejudice described had the
undesirable effect of providing enthusiasm for the enemy, like during the violence of the
Dekemvriana, when American media sources depicted the communist forces as fighting
for the freedom of the Greek people. Nevertheless, Churchill declared that in spite of this
obstacle, the Greek people would look for the job to be done, both militarily and
politically.77
Despite praise from the leaders of the nation he labored to help, Churchill
recognized the need to finalize the place of Britain’s allies in the rebuilding process. As
previously mentioned, the Soviet Union represented a potential obstacle to Greek national
unification, as Balkan nations such as Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria began to
identify with the communist cause. Despite this, negotiations with the Soviet Union went
better than anticipated, as Stalin’s dislike of the Greek Communists mirrored Churchill’s.
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As previously mentioned, a Cabinet minute from February 19th revealed that the emissary
from the Greek Communists to the USSR was put under house arrest and sent back to
Greece. However, as curious as the Soviet’s abandoning of the region was, the fact that
the expulsion of a communist representative from Europe occurred without any
noticeable criticism from the Russian media peaked Churchill’s curiosity.78
As February became March, the view of Soviet inclusion in Greece by the British
did not change, but the American’s began to have their own input. In order to ensure the
continued cooperation of the Soviet Union, Great Britain agreed to give up their influence
in Romania and Bulgaria in exchange for the lead in Greece. Roosevelt questioned this
decision, as the Soviet Union at this time began to go back on many agreements
discussed during the TOLSTOY accords, otherwise known as the Fourth Moscow
Conference, in which the post-war division of the Balkans became a primary discussion
point. Nevertheless, the American president proposed the idea of including the Soviet’s
Commissar for Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to assist in the consultation on Greek
economic potential. Despite this move, British and American politicians alike agreed that
the Russians could not have any influence in the formation of the new Greek national
army, as the opposite would result in the resumption of civil distress at the hands of the
ELAS. April held similar debates, and discussions between the Soviet Union and Great
Britain ended with similar results; the British defended their ideas of Greek elections and
economy, even though the potential of Soviet intervention persisted.79
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March 1945 also signified a time in which the economic consequences and role of
Great Britain in Greece would be examined. According to Secretary Macmillan, the
extent to which Britain had dedicated resources to the reorganization of Greece would
require heavy financial and economic commitments for many years to come. Initially,
Churchill saw the arrangements and actions perpetuated by the United States before the
Yalta Agreement as justification for a lack of trust in their ability to help. However,
Cabinet Minutes from March 6, 1945 asked to consider the Yalta Agreement as the
superseding document to base the relationship off of, one in which the American word
initially proved to be reliable. Finally, by March 12, Secretary Macmillan agreed that in
order for the British vision of Greece to be realized, an increase in military presence
would be called for, although it would be paired with the beginning of the US
government’s involvement in terms of financial and economic matters. For the benefit of
the Churchill, Macmillan assured that the American inclusion into Greece would parallel
British policy thus far.80
One of the more popular ideas for the financial recovery of Greece was to send a
multi-national team of advisors. The United States representative would be Donald
Nelson, who had just completed a similar non-political mission to China, as well as
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Oliver Lyttelton and the previously mentioned Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade
Mikoyan. According to President Roosevelt, this mission would have the added affect of
reinforcing a positive world opinion of the British effort. Evidence of world involvement
was seen in the American media, as The New York Times ran articles that called for
monetary donations for the people of war-torn Greece. Churchill had mixed views on the
potential of this project. On one hand, the inclusion of the Soviet Union and the United
States, including free access to their newspapers, would allow the responsibilities Britain
once had to Greece to be largely discharged within a matter of months. The American
monetary resources would account for such an accelerated time frame. However, the
Prime Minister foresaw the United States taking the credit for the success of Greece,
despite all Great Britain’s work.81
Despite this hesitancy about the United States, Churchill wrote to President
Roosevelt in the early days of April to confirm his hopes for the future of Greece. First,
the Prime Minister acknowledged that not only did he not wish to include the Russians in
the previously discussed economic missions, but also described their potential inclusion
as a purely political gesture. Therefore, he proposed the formation of an Anglo-American
Committee of British and American experts. Among those potential experts, Churchill
urged Donald Nelson to participate. Ultimately, the benefit of the American partnership
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would be the ability of the British to gradually pass the responsibility for Greece onto
another in the upcoming future.82
The months of February, March and April thus signified a transitional period of
British policy in Greece. While the ultimate goal of a democratic Greece remained vital
for Churchill and his administration, the way by which this was to be achieved differed.
Instead of allies being used as tools for Britain’s ultimate gain, communications within
the British government began to describe potential aid from the United States, and the
Soviet Union, as capable of replacing the contributions of Churchill’s government. The
Prime Minister himself acknowledged that it would cause British advisors and military to
remain in the country for far less time. In turn, correspondence from Roosevelt became
increasingly valued council; the amount of time before the Americans could potentially
resume responsibilities in the Balkan nation lessened by political pressure from a primary
power onto a lesser one.
The months of May and June signified the final full months of Churchill’s term as
Prime Minister. Therefore, it was appropriate for the debates that surrounded the Greek
nation to involve both Britain’s legacy in the nation as well as what the Greeks had to do
in the future in order to assure success. Though the Cabinet minutes and telegrams from
the time did not suggest an immediate withdrawal of the British, discussions occurred as
to the ability of the Greek government to assume roles previously assisted by their
European friends. Nevertheless, as the interests and potential contributions of the Allies
became more pronounced, the Churchill administration’s role became increasingly
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marginalized. This different position epitomized Great Britain’s descent from a primary
power into a secondary one.
One factor that needed to remain a constant for the successful rebuilding of
Greece was a stable government. While support for the Archbishop remained a constant,
the Prime Ministers remained volatile in terms of support of the public and regent. In the
month prior, General Plastiras was forced to resign after he released a letter that favored
German intervention in 1941. Even after the letter caused an uproar in the country,
Plastiras refused to step down. With advice from ministers of every party, Damaskinos
appointed an individual he believed could garner the support of the divided people, as
well as guarantee a successful plebiscite within three months, Admiral Petros Voulgaris.
The British relationship with the admiral was strengthened by the fact that he was
credited with the halt of the mutinous Greeks in Egypt from April of the previous year.
It did not take long for many within the British government to realize that Voulgaris
represented the best option for a stable Greek government thus far. In a telegram to
Churchill on May 5, 1945, Leeper stated that little friction existed between the Admiral
and the British government during their consultations, a notable rarity. In the face of
other issues that troubled Greece at the time, a stable government would allow future
goals to be accomplished without the turbulence common in the previous months.
Voulgaris, according to Leeper, had every chance of success, as he possessed great
admiration for the British.83
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However, this telegram also held the beginnings of a discussion about an
important factor of the Greek issue, the British legacy. As economic hardships hampered
the Balkan nation, Leeper wrote to his Prime Minister that, “good government publicity
is the best way for the Greek Government to capture public confidence.”84 More
specifically, even a loan of a good public relations officer for a few months could capture
the volatile public confidence, to convince both British and Greek citizens alike that
various government economic and control policies ultimately benefit the people. With
this in mind, Leeper reminded that, “His majesty’s Government can hope justifiably, to
get credit for producing order out of chaos; enabling free election to be held, and lifting a
very shattered Balkan country onto a higher level than it has known.”85
One of the clear signs that the British legacy was a successful one depended on
the ability of the Greeks to assume the task of nation building. On June 2, 1945, Churchill
sent a telegram to Admiral Voulgaris that discussed the arrival of Kyriakos Varvaresos,
chief officer of the Bank of Greece, to Athens in assistance to the Greek government in
the face of economic and financial problems. Within the telegram, Churchill praised the
nation as a whole, as he continued to be “encouraged by the improvement which has
taken place in the political situation,” for which Admiral Vulgaris should have received
credit.86 Though he showed pride in the progress made by all within the country,
Churchill urged the people to put aside the passions that lead to civil strife in order to
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assure the improvements would be maintained, and that democratic principles would be
firmly re-established.87
Nevertheless, all the social cohesion could not solve the rapid deterioration of the
financial situation in Greece. For British Ministers such as Harold Macmillan, the time
had come to transfer a major portion of the responsibility from General Scobie and to the
British embassy in Athens. Yet, with the exception of a limited scope of accessible
imports, the problem could only be solved by efforts within the nation itself. According
to Macmillan, “an external loan would be of no assistance, since the Greeks have enough
foreign exchange…and a long, or even a money gift, would not affect the currency
circulation within Greece itself.”88 The root of the problem was that the amount of
money, which circulated throughout the country, was increasing much more rapidly than
the supply of goods that could be bought. The austerity measures needed to correct this
economic course could have been undertaken by the British, and would have if not given
the political and economic state of their own nation at the time. In addition, the Cabinet
agreed that British interference with the Greek government would only create additional
unrest within the country. Great Britain did not possess the necessary available military
or economic resources to take control of the Balkan nation, a condition directly connected
to their descent from primary power status.89
This telegram from Minister Macmillan held additional instances of British
hesitation to further involve themselves in Greece. For example, Macmillan insisted that,
“the bulk of the supplies which will be provided during the next six or twelve months
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must come from U.N.R.R.A.”90 For programs that could not be covered by this kind of
aid, such as railway reconstruction, the assistance of Great Britain, and more significantly
the United States, would allow for the Balkan nation to import the materials necessary
and slowly reduce the risk of inflation. In addition, despite the need for a sustainable and
stable Greek armed force, the mostly American aid would only allow for a hundred
thousand man civil defense force, which would mean that “for some time Greece must be
inferior in military power…and she would not be in a position to defend the country from
external attacks.”91 In both the economic and military arenas, Churchill’s inability to
dedicate tangible resources, as well as the consistent move to rely on American relief,
clearly displayed the actions of a power well on its way to decline.92
Further examination of the nature of American aid occurred in a telegram from
Sir Desmond Morton, the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister, to Churchill, as well
as a Cabinet minute from June 20, 1945. While Morton urged the Prime Minister to
remember that the Britain must commit to aid both Italy and Greece to achieve a
reasonable standard of life, he also clarified a key source of this aid. According to this
source, the integral aid would come from their American allies, as long as the internal
politics of the country would allow them. The Cabinet minute reinforced this idea when it
advocated for, “an Anglo-American Production mission to be sent to Greece to advise the
Greeks how they could best help themselves.”93 Another advantage of this mission would
be the invaluable expertise the two nations could provide to increase industrial
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production, as well as increased imports, and the U.N.R.R.A would respond to requests
for supplies and shipping.94
However, the one aspect of British intervention that both countries agreed on was
the continuation of British assistance with the military, despite earlier communications
that hoped for a withdrawal of the army’s resources. Prime Minister Voulgaris stated that
Great Britain’s leadership could make for a more time-efficient mission completion. In
addition, fear still persisted within the country’s leadership that only through the
utilization of a third party, such as Great Britain, could it be assured that no political
advantages or activities would taint the rebuilding process. This decision was tempered
with the official statement that Greeks should be the head of the military mission.
Ultimately, Leeper and General Scobie reached an agreement at the end of June to
include the Greek government in the assumption of powers over the Greek Army,
including appointments, promotions, dismissals and discipline. The combination of Greek
and British interests together would be known as the Supreme War Council. If at any
point the Greek authorities believed the British council was not acting in their best
general interest, the dispute would be taken to the diplomatic level between the two
nation’s embassies.95
In the six months since the outbreak of violence in Athens, the nature of British
involvement in Greece underwent a distinct change, as did their stature in the
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international community. While the establishment of a democratic Greece remained the
goal throughout this period, the method by which Britain attempted to accomplish this
varied throughout, and became a symptom of their place amongst world powers. Even
though negotiations between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt were common, Churchill’s
talks were not for the sake of political positioning, but political survival. Especially given
the economic resources of Britain at this time, the inclusion of the Allies into Greece was
necessary for their vision of the Balkan nation to persist after an inevitable European
withdrawal. As important as the economics were to the future of Greece, the debate
developed into something more complex. While well-aware of the growing power of the
United States and Soviet Union, Great Britain continued to fight for hegemony in an old
sphere of historic influence. Whether as a result of quick successes, like the defeat of the
Egyptian Mutiny, or prolonged debates, such as over the plebiscite, each trial for
Churchill exposed a different fundamental weakness in the British political state.
Ultimately, the admittance of these shortcomings cemented Great Britain’s role as
a secondary consideration, as it would not be long until the financial weight of the United
States, and the political influence of the Soviet Union took assumed control over this
conflict between communism and democracy for themselves, leaving Great Britain as an
ancillary spectator in future Cold War forums.

